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Does language equal thought?

An idea fundamental to cognitive science is that it may be possible to describe our thought processes through some representational system. Whether the appropriate representational system
has properties similar to linguistic properties (such as observing
similar principles) is an open question that scholars will no doubt
be debating for years. Here, however, I’d like to address related
questions, ones that I believe we can answer together: Do we think
in language? Could we think without a language?
One way to interpret these questions is as follows: Does language construct a mental world that cognitively fences us in?
This might well be a familiar question to you since it is frequently
debated.
One can also interpret these questions in the most mundane
way, the way people do when they say things such as “It’s so noisy
I can’t hear myself think”—that is, asking whether human beings
think in speciﬁc human languages. In other words, do people
from Italy think in Italian? Or, given that the Italian language
has many dialects, we could break down this basic question into
multiple ones such as these: Do Venetians think in Venetian? Do
Neapolitans think in Napoletano? Likewise, do Indians, Australians, Canadians, Americans, Nigerians, and the British think in
their own national varieties of English? We can get nicer: Do Bostonians and Atlantans and Philadelphians think in their urban
50
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varieties? With either interpretation, the rest of this chapter aims
to convince you that the answer to these questions is no.
I am ﬁrst going to argue that thought does not require language by giving you instances of thought that couldn’t possibly have been formulated in the brain in terms of language.
The argument is a little long, so please keep that end point in
sight.
Think about living with a toddler. Let me give you ﬁve scenarios that I’ve witnessed—three typical, two just plain wonderful—in which children did not use spoken or sign language. Then
I bring out their relevance as a group to the central question of
this chapter.
1. A boy plows a plastic truck across frozen grass. Another boy
comes over, watches for a while, and then throws a handful of
dirt on the ﬁrst boy. The ﬁrst boy picks up his truck, takes it to
the area behind the swing set, and resumes plowing there.
2. My grandniece is coloring vehemently, and she rips the
paper with the crayon. She takes another piece of paper, tapes it
over the rip, and continues coloring.
3. A girl in the grocery store reaches for candy at the checkout
aisle. Her mother says she can’t have it. The girl throws a
tantrum. Her mother’s cheeks ﬂame, and she gives the girl the
candy.
4. Some three-year-olds sit in a line at the edge of a swimming
pool, all of them with their feet dangling in the water. A man is
teaching them to swim. He takes the ﬁrst child on one end of the
line and dunks him. That boy laughs. The instructor lifts him out
of the pool, and the boy goes to the other end of the line. The
instructor does the same to the next child, working his way along
the line. My daughter, who is terriﬁed of pools, is in the middle
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of the line. When the instructor lifts the third child, my daughter
reaches both hands into the pool, splashes herself, then runs to
the end of the line—with the children who have already been
dunked.
5. A boy goes to the beach with his family. The family on the
next blanket has a blind child. The two children start digging
together. At one point the mother of the ﬁrst boy calls him over
for a snack of carrot sticks. The boy takes his bag to the other
boy and holds it out for him. When the blind boy doesn’t react,
the ﬁrst boy takes the blind boy’s hand (so beautifully covered
with sand) and sticks it into the plastic bag. They share sandy
carrots.
All of these scenarios give evidence of reasoning on the part
of the child and, thus, of thought. Perhaps you disagree with me
about one or another, but surely you agree about at least one. Now
we are almost ready to approach the question of the relationship
of thought to language in these types of scenarios.
But ﬁrst let’s consider one more situation. Consider the
case of a hard-of-hearing or completely deaf child born to
hearing parents. Often the fact that the child in this situation
does not (adequately) hear is not detected until the child is
a toddler or older. This is the case because the child exhibits behavior that is typical of toddlers—behavior precisely like
that described in the preceding scenarios. That is, deaf children act just like hearing children in these sorts of situations.
Yet deaf children whose deafness has not yet been discovered
are linguistically deprived. Only after someone recognizes that
these children don’t hear can linguistic information be given
to them—whether in the form of access to spoken language
via hearing aids or cochlear implants, lessons in speech reading
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(what we used to call “lip-reading”), and/or lessons in vocalization or in the form of teaching the child (and often the whole
family) to use sign language.
In other words, long before these deaf children have access to
linguistic input, they do think, as is obvious from their thoughtdemonstrating behavior. There is no possibility, however, that
their thought is in a speciﬁc human language since they have not
even begun to acquire any speciﬁc human language.
A similar kind of argument can be made by looking at the
studies of Genie, a young girl who was discovered in 1970 in Los
Angeles, living in captive isolation that limited both her physical
activity and linguistic input (also discussed in chapter 1). At the
time of her discovery, she could hardly walk and gave no indication of knowing what speech was. Several researchers worked for
years to teach Genie language, and although she never progressed
beyond an unsystematic stringing together of a few words, she
did manage to talk about the events of her life, including events
that had happened prior to her gaining linguistic knowledge.
Clearly, these memories constitute thought—thought that was
independent of linguistic structure.
Another way to argue that thought is not equivalent to speciﬁc language is to consider our vocabulary. If a language has a
word for a given concept and another language lacks a word for
that concept, does it follow that the given concept is mentally
accessible to people of the ﬁrst language and inaccessible to people
of the second? That is, do the two sets of speakers think differently?
In answering this question, consider your own experiences in
life. When you meet a new word, are you necessarily meeting a
new concept? Let’s say that I ask you to mix yellow and blue paints
in varying amounts and put the different colors in a set of bowls.
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Along the way, you happen to mix up chartreuse, but you don’t
know the particular word chartreuse. If I tell you that the mix in
one bowl is called chartreuse, all I’ve done is given you a label.
However, you already recognized the concept, or you wouldn’t
have put it in one of the bowls. That is, unless you are blind or color-blind, the actual qualities of the color precede your labeling of
it. To take a more familiar example, in the United States, in voting
booths many states have ballots that are punched by machine. The
little parts that fall out of the ballot when it is punched are called
chads. Before the presidential election of 2000, many Americans
didn’t know the word chad, but they were nevertheless familiar
with the concept.
In these types of situations it seems rather obvious that the
concept of an object can be understood without a word for that
object, but what about a situation in which the concept concerns
the identiﬁcation not of a concrete object but rather of an abstract
one?
Let me present two examples, contrasting English and Italian,
as we consider whether the vocabulary difference between the two
languages reveals a difference in thought possibilities. Italian lacks
a vocabulary item corresponding to the English word privacy. Are
we to conclude, then, that Italians do not understand the concept?
Surely this is not a proper conclusion, and a simple observation
of Italians’ habits reveals this fact. Italians close the door when
they use a public bathroom, they do not have sexual relations in
public, and they do not ask personal questions of people they are
not intimate with. In other words, they respect privacy regardless
of the fact that they have no single word denoting that concept.
So, although they will use a circumlocution to translate “Please
respect my privacy,” they understand the concept and communicate it effectively. Indeed, they have an adjective that is translated
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as ‘private’; they simply have a lexical gap (from an English perspective) when it comes to the relevant noun.
On the other hand, Italian has the word scaramanzia, for
which I know no single vocabulary item of English that can serve
as a translation. Scaramanzia is the superstition that makes us say
that the worst is going to happen in order to ward it off. For example, both my sisters had breast cancer, so I told my doctor (among
others) that I’m bound to get it. However, my fervent hope is
that I won’t, and there’s an ignorant but nonetheless real sense in
me that by saying I will get it, I’ve robbed that terrible evil of its
power. I’ve been doing things like that all my life, long before I had
ever heard the word scaramanzia. And now that I’ve described this
to you, I’m sure you understand the concept (which doesn’t mean
that you share my ignorant attraction to magic), whether you’ve
ever practiced this behavior or not. Although most Italians and
Americans do not practice this behavior regularly, the fact that
people of both cultures understand the concept and occasionally
practice it shows that understanding the concept is independent of
having a vocabulary item in one’s language that denotes it.
In sum, the presence and lack of the words privacy and scaramanzia in Italian and English tell us nothing whatsoever about
differences between the ways English speakers and Italian speakers
think.
Analogous arguments can be made by looking at vocabulary
differences in any two languages. German has the word Schadenfreude, which is a compound of the root for ‘damage’ and the root
for ‘joy.’ Schadenfreude is the pleasure one takes in the misfortunes of others. Although you might not have experienced this
pleasure, nor might many Germans, you can understand the concept regardless of the fact that English has no such word. Often
the villains in soap operas and the like are more hateful because
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we recognize that they experience Schadenfreude. One language
will coin a word for a given concept, whereas another language will not. Scholars of various disciplines (psychology, sociology) might debate the reasons for this, but the important point
for us is simply that the speakers of both languages can understand the concept, regardless.
You might argue that the existence of a word for a concept in
a given language in some way legitimizes or licenses the concept
in that linguistic community. That is, we have a word for it, so the
concept must be shared by many and is, therefore, somehow more
true or real than it might be without a linguistic label. This could
be right. Nevertheless, the licensing of a concept is distinct from
the ability to grasp it. In the college where I work, many ﬁrst-year
students enter with the fear that our highly selective admissions
committee made a mistake and they don’t belong here. We have
no single word for this fear (which is shared by ﬁrst-year students
on many campuses, no doubt), but it’s easy to recognize and understand.
Vocabulary differences are not the only differences between
languages, so we should turn now to other types of differences and
ask what they tell us about the relationships between language and
thought. Some scholars have argued that a certain population cannot reason in the same way as another population because of syntactic differences between the languages of the two populations. Instead
of reporting on that literature (which would require a lengthy discussion), I’ll present an analogous situation that has not been widely
discussed in this light. We will look again at a contrast between Italian and English, this time focusing on sentence structure.
In English we can say, “John beat the eggs stiff,” meaning that
John beat the eggs with the result that they became stiff. The word
stiff in this sentence is called a resultative secondary predicate. In
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Romance languages the literal translation of that sentence is not
grammatical because Romance languages do not allow resultative
secondary predicates in as wide a range of sentence structures as
English does. Instead, in a Romance language you’d say something
that would be translated literally as ‘John beat the eggs until they
became stiff’ or ‘John beat the eggs to the point of (their) being
stiff.’ A person who holds to the idea that thought is language
might try to use this information to argue that Italians, Spaniards,
Romanians, French, Portuguese, and speakers of other Romance
languages cannot understand the concept of direct result. But that’s
obviously false. Speakers of Romance languages clearly understand
the concept of direct result; they simply have available a different
range of sentence structures to render it.
Analogous arguments can be built around other sentence
structure differences between languages. For example, some languages express possession by a verb that can be translated as ‘have.’
Others, however, express it in other ways, such as by stating existence with respect to something else. For example, to express
‘I have a sister’ in Russian, one would say u menja sestra. A wordby-word translation of this is ‘with-me-sister.’ (Note that there is
no verb here. Typically the verb that means ‘be’ is omitted when
the present tense is to be conveyed.) Does that mean that the
speakers of the ﬁrst type of language (including English) have a
different sense of possession from the speakers of the second type
of language (including Russian)? In particular, do we think of sisters differently? At a certain point, the proposition that structural
differences between languages are evidence of differences in conceptual behavior between peoples leads to nonsense. In my opinion, this is one of those times.
Another argument that language and thought are not equivalent comes from the fact that we can speak without thinking. We
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do it much too often, are surprised at what we have said, and then
correct it. In fact, we can even read without thinking, coming to
the end of the page and realizing that we have no idea what we’ve
just read. Sometimes we can read aloud, thus indisputably using our
language mechanism, and still think about something else, so that
we lose our place in the passage and don’t even know what we’ve
read and what we haven’t. Similarly, if you’ve ever heard particularly verbal preschoolers speak, you’ll be amazed by their ﬂuency
and ability to express even abstract concepts, for example when
talking about future events. In the following sentence, for instance,
uttered by a three-year-old boy whose grandfather lives in a different country and only gets to visit him once or twice a year, the boy
expresses something about a future event, without really having a
concept of time: “I’m putting all these things in a bag for grandpa
because when he comes and we ﬁx the bench together, we need
this.” A moment later, the boy could be throwing a tantrum about
not being able to go to the playground right that moment but having to wait until a little later, demonstrating that future events are
hard for him to integrate into his thinking. It is obvious, then, that
preschoolers’ reasoning ability lags far behind their speaking ability.
This is particularly striking evidence that language (whether in the
form of speaking or reading) and thought cannot be one and the
same, nor are they even necessarily dependent on each another.
Many more arguments can be brought to bear on the question of whether thought equals language. We could ask whether
animals think, and if our answer is positive (as mine is), we must
abandon the notion that thought is language since animals do not
have language in the sense that humans do (a point discussed in
chapter 6). We could ask whether people who have brain disease
or injury that robs them of language still think, and if our answer
is positive, we must again abandon this notion. However, even
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without looking at the vast amount of research on animals and on
language pathologies, that is, without looking at research that goes
beyond our daily experience, we can debunk certain myths about
language simply by looking at the evidence available in everyday
life. The myth that we think in speciﬁc languages is one of those
debunkable myths, as we’ve already seen.
This conclusion does not minimize the importance of the various relationships that hold between language and thought. Language facilitates the introduction and transmission of thoughts,
and a particular phrasing of a concept can give it a slant that
offers the listener a new perspective. Sometimes we may not
even be quite sure of our thoughts until we put them into language, which is one reason that talking to a conﬁdant when making crucial decisions can be so valuable. Speaking one’s mind or
writing one’s ideas can also help one to recognize the form of a
particular rational argument one is developing. Using language
can help us in analysis of many types, just as drawing what we
saw can help us understand its signiﬁcance. Nonetheless, the
drawing is not tantamount to the act of seeing; likewise, expressing oneself in language is not tantamount to the act of thinking.
Language is like a hanger that we put our thoughts on. When
the clothing is in a pile on the ﬂoor, it might be harder to recognize it for what it truly is. The structure of the hanger clariﬁes the
structure of the clothing, but clariﬁcation of an essence is distinct
from the essence itself.
In sum, whether or not we have words for concepts, we can
and do entertain those concepts, and some concepts we may never
have words for—because they are ineffable.
I want to close with a ﬁnal consideration, which again connects to daily experience—one I’d simply like to pose. Observe the
following conversation between two speakers:
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I hate snakes.
Do you remember Mrs. Bicknell?
Our eighth-grade social studies teacher?
Yes.
Sure, I remember her. Why?
Well, when you said snakes, I remembered the day I went to
talk to her after school about how my family was falling
apart, and she asked me what the matter was and if
Patrick had walked some other girl home, and she was
so condescending that I just left and walked home alone
and saw this twisted stick by the sidewalk, and I said,
“You look like a crazy snake. Hello, you crazy snake.”
I thought I was alone, but Patrick was walking right
behind me, and he said, “I always thought you were
crazy, but now I know.”
Oh.
When the second speaker goes into that long speech, you can see
how much thought she’s reporting—thought that apparently took
place between the ﬁrst utterance (“I hate snakes.”) and the second
(“Do you remember Mrs. Bicknell?”) If all of that thought took
place in actual English sentences, it would have had to come at a
remarkable speed. In addition, although the production of English
in this long thought between the ﬁrst and the second utterance
would be free of speech production—and thus free of the slowness of the speech articulators (the tongue, the lips, the bottom
jaw, and all the other parts of the body that participate in speech
production)—it is still a stream of silent words, which if spoken
would come as fast as a voice recording increased to a continuous squeak. The speed of thought exceeds that of speech, of the
fastest ﬁngers typing, and even of a brief, meaningful look. Can
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silent language possibly be that fast? Ideally, we should design an
experiment to measure the speed of silent language at this point. If
we cannot do that, if we cannot devise some way to test whether
or not silent language has the characteristics of thought (such as
great speed), we are left in an unsupported position.
But even without experimental evidence, we can push the
hypothesis—that language and thought are equivalent—to an
absurd end by considering the language and thought of Deaf people (by Deaf with a capital “D,” I mean people whose primary language is a sign language) with regard to speed. Signs generally take
about twice as long to produce as words. So do Deaf people think
twice as slowly as hearing people (since they would be thinking in
visual signs)? Moreover, some Deaf people have mastered spoken
languages. I have such friends, and they speak English at the ordinary rate. So do these Deaf people think at double the rate when
they are speaking as when they are signing? The proposal, again,
is nonsensical to me.
Thought is thought. Language is language. The two are
distinct.
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